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[L. A. No. 20243. In Bank. May 3, 1948.]

LEO GALLAGHER, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF
THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et a!., Respondents.
[1] Contemp.t-Misconduct of Attorneys.-While the fact that a
woman is named by jurors as having attempted to influence
them does not give her or her attorney a right to take part in
proceedings in the case to determine possible jury tampering,
a mere mistaken act by the attorney, such as a request for the
privilege of cross-examining and an attempt to cross-examine
the jurors, cannot render him guilty of contempt where he
does not resort to deceit or to wilful obstruction of the orderly
processes, where there is nothing contemptuous in the words
used by him, and where the judge does not caution him regarding his demeanor, facial expressions or tone of voice.
[2a,2b] ld.-Misconduct of Attorneys.-Wbere in a proceeding
to determine possible jury tampering the judge directed that
a woman named by jurors as having attempted to influence
them be taken by the bailiff to the district attorney's office,
she was entitled to be heard in person or through her attorney, and the attorney was not guilty of contempt in asking
the judge the purpose of such order and whether his client
was under arrest, in the absence of any showing that the words
used by him were contemptuous, that his conduct tended to
interrupt the due course of the examination, or that the judge
had warned him that his tone of voice and facial expressions
were offensive.

[8] ld.-Misconduct of Attorneys.-An attorney has the duty to
protect the interests of his client. He has a right to press
[2] Necessity and sufficiency of making and recording subsidiary
or detailed findings supporting adjudication of direct contempt,
note, 154 A.L.R. 1227. See, also, 5 Cal.Jur. 900; 12 Am.Jur. 396.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Contempt, § 15.

)

May 1948)

GALLAGHER

v.

MUNICIPAL COURT

785

(31 C.2d '184; 192 P.2d 1105)

legitimate argument and to protest an erroneous court ruling,
without on that account being chargeable as being in contempt
of court.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to' review an order of the
Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles and Byron J. Walters, Judge thereof, adjudging contempt of court. Order
annulled.
Katz, Gallagher & Margolis, Charles J. Katz, A. L. Wirin,
Ben Margolis, Samuel W. Blum and Nathaniel Holtzman for
Petitioner.
Clore Warne, George Altman, Morris Cohn, Loren Miller
and Charles Christopher, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Donald M. Redwine, ABsistant City Attorney, and John L. Bland, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding in certiorari petitioner,
an attorney, seeks to annul an order of the Los Angeles Municipal Court adjudging him in contempt of court and committing him to the city jail for five days. The alleged contempt
occurred in open court during the course of a judicial proceeding.
The order adjudging petitioner in contempt was the culmination of an extraordinary sequence of events. In the course
of a jury trial, three of the jurors complained to the trial
judge that a Mrs. Hill approached them in the corridor of
the courthouse and conversed with them. The judge declared
a recess, stating: "The court will examine into an alleged
and reported matter of interference with the jurors in this
case." Mr. Allen, counsel for the defendants in the recessed
trial, advised Mrs. Hill that she should be represented by
counsel. Mrs. Hill told him that she wished to retain petitioner who was in the courtroom at that time. Petitioner
talked to Mrs. Hill and, upon her direct request, consented
to represent her.
The trial judge conducted the examination and caused the
first witness to be sworn. The pertinent portions of the proceedings are as follows:
"THE CoURT: Mrs. Morehouse, did someone approach you
and make a remark'
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MR. GALLAGHER [Petitioner]: Just a minute, if the Court
please. My name is Leo Gallagher and I am attorney for Mrs.
Hill. I am going to object to that question as a leading question propounded by the Court to the witness.
"THE COURT: Mrs. Hill is not on trial. I am making an
investigation, counsel.
"MR. GALLAGHER: I understand that.
"THE COURT: You are attorney for Mrs. Hill'
"MR. GALLAGHER: Yes.
"THE CoURT: The objection is overrpled."
The trial judge then questioned the witness and obtained
her version of a conversation with Mrs. Hill.
"THE COURT: That's aU.
"MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question. Did you
have a sign across the front of your chest indicating that you
were a juror'
"THE COURT: I don't know that you have any place in
here. I am investigating this case.
"MR. GALLAGHER: You want a fair investigation, don't you'
"THE CoURT: It is not a trial.
"Ma. GALLAGHER: But you want a fair investigation'
"THE COURT: It is not a trial.
"MR. GALLAGHER: I know that, but you want a fair investigation'
"THE CoURT: Step down, madam.
"Ma. GALLAGHER: Don't you want a fair investigation of
this'
"THE CoURT: Mr. Gallagher, will you please stay out of
these proceedings f "
The judge nevertheless allowed Mr. Allen to question the
witness before dismissing her. The second complaining juror
was then sworn and examined at length by the court and Mr•
.Allen, after which occurred the following interchange:
"Ma. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question.
"THE COURT: Denied.
.
"Ma. GALLAGHER: Denied! You are Dot going to let me
ask her a question'
"THE COURT: Ca11 Mrs. Carlquist.
"Ma. GALLAGHER: As a friend of the Court I would like
to ask a question so that you will get a full picture of what
happened here.
"Tm: COURT: Denied."

I
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The third complaining juror was next sworn and examined
first by the court and then by Mr. Allen. After they finished,
petitioner spoke to the court:
"MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question.
"THE COURT: Denied. Mrs. Hill will be taken by the Bailiff
of this court to the District Attorney's office.
"MR. GALLAGHER: To the District Attorney's office f
c'THE COURT : Yes.
"MR. GALLAGHER: For what purpose, please' Are you
putting her under arrest, if the Court please T Is she under
arrest f Will you kindly answer that question, Judge, whether
she is under arrest at this time T Won't you hear my argument'
"THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher, you are declared in contempt
of court and sentenced to five days in the City Jail. The Clerk
will prepare the commitment and take Mr. Gallagher into
custody. "
The order of the trial judge stated: "Whereas, said statements were made by said Leo Gallagher in a loud, insolent,
aggressive, belligerent, boisterous, harsh, offensive and contemptuous tone of voice and with a sneering and contemptuous expression on his face and a threatening demeanor toward
said court and the judge thereof and in disobedience of the
lawful orders of the court, and in a disorderly and insolent
manner toward the judge of said court. That said statements
and conduct of said Leo Gallagher tended to and did interrupt
the due course of said trial and did obstruct the administration of justice and interfere with the orderly proceedings of
the court at said time and place aforesaid, and said statements, acts and conduct did tend to and did bring the court
into contempt and tended to and did interrupt its proceedings and did impair respect for said court and the judge
thereof and their authority, and tended to and did breach the
peace of said judicial proceedings and created a violent disturbance thereof, interfering with the due and orderly course
of said trial. . . ."
According to the order of the trial judge, the alleged contempt took place while the court was "engaged in the hearing
on a matter of tampering with jurors" in a case then before
the court. The trial judge presumably commenced the investigation to determine whether the jury had been influenced,
since it was possible that Mrs. Hill's alleged conduct would
lead him to declare a mistrial. Respondent contends that
Mrs. Hill was not entitled, as a matter of constitutional right,

)
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to interrogate the witnesses through her counsel, since she
was not charged with any crime and was not called as a witness. Mrs. Hill was apparently required to remain in the
courtroom during the investigation. This investigation might
have resulted in the filing of a complaint charging Mrs. Hill
with the felony of jury tampering (Pen. Code, § 95) or with
some other crime. (See Pen. Code, § 849.) It is not disputed
that Mrs. Hill was entitled to advice of counsel and to the
presence of her counsel in the event that she should be called
as a witness or should be charged with a crime, and the fact
that the hearing did not immediately, result in the filing of
a complaint does not alter the seriousness of her position.
Indeed, she was taken to the district attorney under arrest,
for some undisclosed purpose, at the conclusion of the examination.
[1] Respondent contends, however, that despite Mrs. Hill's
right to be accompanied and advised by counsel, her counsel
was not authorized to cross-examine witnesses and to inject
himself into the proceedings unless and until Mrs. Hill was
called as a witness or charged with a public offense. It is
unnecessary to hold that petitioner, as counsel for Mrs. Hill,
had any such right. It is sufficient merely to state that there
was no impropriety in his attempt to take part in the investigation. Mrs. Hill and petitioner had no way of knowing
how the investigation might affect her rights, but they had
reasonable grounds for the conclusion that she would be
affected in some way.
The trial judge acted within the law and within reasonable limits of judicial discretion in denying to petitioner any
participation in the inquiry that he was conducting into the
matter of possible tampering with the jury. Mr. Gallagher was
not an attorney representing any party in the case on trial;
the fact that Mrs. Hill was named by jurors as having perhaps improperly communicated with them did not give her
or her attorney a right to take part in proceedings in that
ease. But certainly a mere mistaken act by counsel cannot
render him in contempt of court. Even if a legal proposition is untenable, counsel may properly urge it in good faith;
he may do 80 even though he may not expect to be successful,
provided of course, that he does not resort to deceit or to
wilful obstruction of the orderly processes. Here the transcript
indicates-and there seems to be nothing whatsoever equivocal
about this-that petitioner respected the rulings of the court
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and abided by them down to the point where the judge directeo
that "Mrs. Hill will be taken by the Bailiff of this court to the
District Attorney's office."
Petitioner;s participation in the investigation consisted of
his attempt to cross-examine witnesses who testified that Mrs.
Hill had tried to influence them while they were acting as
jurors. There was nothing contemptuo~ in the words used
by petitioner in this connection, and the record shows that
the trial judge was not concerned with petitioner's manner
but was determined to bar him from participation in the proceedings. The judge did not caution petitioner or even remark
about petitioner's demeanor or facial expressions or tone of
voice. Thus, although petitioner had no right to cross-examine
witnesses in an investigation to determine whether a mistrial
should be declared, petitioner cannot be held in contempt for
requesting the privilege of doing so. After the judge asked
petitioner to "stay out of these proceedings," petitioner
directed his requests to the court and these requests were
summarily denied. Until the trial judge gave his order to
the bailiff, therefore, petitioner did nothing to interfere with
the normal course of the investigation, and nowhere up to
that point does the record show any criticism or admonition
by the trial judge regarding petitioner's conduct or manner.
[2a] When Mrs. Hill was ordered taken to the district
attorney's office, petitioner asked, ••To the District A ttorney's office T ••• For what purpose, please Y Are you putting
her under arrest, if the Court please T Is she under arrest 7
Will you kindly answer that question, Judge, whether she is
under arrest at this timet Won't you hear my argumentT"
These were the statements that led directly to the order of
contempt. When the trial judge directed that Mrs. Hill be
taken by the bailiff to the district attorney's office, he changed
the character of the proceedings. At that point he went beyond the bounds of conducting the trial of the case before
him. That order was not material to the determination of
any issue in the case; it directly affected Mrs. Hill and entitled
her to be heard in person or through her counsel. Mr. Gallagher's conduct from that point on is to be appraised in
relation to representation of a client under arrest and not in
relation to the rulings that had been made during the inquiry
that was part of or incidental to the case on trial. Mrs. Hill
had a right to know the purpose of ordering her into the custody of the bailiff and, since she was represented by counsel
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present at the time, her counsel was a proper person to discover it; indeed: he would clearly have been guilty of dereliction of duty to his client if he failed to do so. The trial judge,
in turn, as the one who made the order of disposition, W88
the logical person to answer counsel's questions.
The record therefore shows that an attorney has been adjudged in contempt of court for regularly and faithfully
representing the interests of his client. There is nothing contemptuous in ptltitioner's words and nothing in the record to
show that his conduct tended to interrupt the due course of
the examination. Accordingly, the question presented in this
proceeding is whether the trial court's description of petitioner's facial expressions and tone of voice is sufficient to support
the order of contempt, when all that appears from the record
shows that petitioner addressed the court properly in the regular course of litigation. This question has been considered
in several cases by the District Courts of Appeal, but with
apparently con1licting results.
In re Shortridge, 5 Cal.App. 371 [90 P. 478], was a ease
in which an attorney was held in contempt for addressing the
court while a witness was being examined, after the court
had ordered him not to do so. Petitioner was discharged on '
habeas corpus because the District Court of Appeal decided
that the recital of facts in the order was insufficient; the
opinion of the court stated that the petitioner might have had
the right and the duty to address the court and, in the absence
of additional information, the mere fact that he did so was
an insufficient ground for contempt. With respect to a statement in the contempt order that petitioner's conduct was
"boisterous and offensive" the court stated that "reading
this statement in connection with the context in which it
occurs, it is clear that the order means no more by this than
to state a conclusion from the fact that he persisted in addressing the court against the order of the court." (In re Shortridge, 5 Cal.App.378 [90 P. 478].)
In Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App. 463 [I6a
P. 2371. petitioner was counsel for the contestee in an election
contest. Petitioner objected to the use of the county clerk'8
deputies in counting the ballots, on the ground that the clerk
was prejudiced against his client. The trial judge refused
to hear his argument, ordered petitioner to sit down and told
petitioner's associate to cond~ct the case for the contestee.
The associate objected to this ruling and the trial .judge in-
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formed him that petitioner could participate in the case but
could not conduct it. When petitioner made an objection to
the introduction of certain evidencc immediately thereafter,
he was adjudged in contempt. Thc trial judge stated in his
order that petitioner refused to sit down; that he continued
to argue with the court; that he resisted the bailiff; and that
he created noise and confusion in open court by loud talking
and tripping over chairs. The District Court of Appeal annulled the order on certiorari, finding that the trial judge had
been arbitrary and that petitioner had used respectful language
in the performance of his duty. The court stated the following
rule as applicable to an attorney: "If, in discharging his
duty, he happens to be persistent or vehement or both in the
presentation of his points, he is still, nevertheless, within his
legitimate rights as an attorney, so long as his language is
not offensive or in contravention of the common rules of
decorum and propriety. As well may be expected in forensic
polemics, he cannot always be right, and may wholly be wrong
in his position upon the legal question under argument, and
to the mind of the court so plainly wrong that the latter
may conceive that it requires no enlightenment from the argument of counsel. But, whether right or wrong, he has the
right to an opportunity to present his theory of the case on
any occasion where the exigency of the pending point in his
judgment requires or justifies it." (Platnauer v. Superior
Oourt, supra, at p. 475.)
Ourran v. Superior Oourt, 72 Cal.App. 258 [236 P. 975],
is closely analogous to the instant case. There petitioner
asked a question of a witness and the district attorney objected to the form of the question. The court sustained the
objection and petitioner assigned the ruling as error. The
trial judge then ordered petitioner to sit down while questioning the witness. Petitioner asserted his right to stand
up while questioning witnesses, and was adjudged in contempt. The trial court's order used a number of adjectives
to describe petitioner's conduct: " . . . said statements above
outlined were disorderly, contemptuous and insolent to the
Court on your part . . . and directly tended to interrupt the
proceedings of said court and to impair the respect due to
the authority of said court . . . . Said statements addreSRed
to the court were spoken in a very loud, combative and
antagonistic tone of voice, and . . . said attitude and in-
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tonationsand loud expressions by you were disorderly, con·
temptuous and insulting to the Court. . .. " (Curran v.
S1tpcrior Court, supra, at pp. 262.263.)
The District Court of Appeal annulled the order on cer·
tiorari. It stated that "The language used by petitioner wa.q
not in itself insulting, but was brief and directly to the
point," and that the court's order was "due to a momentary
forgetfulness of the rights of petitioner as an officer of the
court in the discharge of his duty to his client and the public,
and [the order] was not made necessary or proper by any
preceding act or misconduct on th~ part of petitioner."
(Curran v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 265.266.) With
respect to petitioner's tone of voice and manner, the court
quoted with approval from the Platnauer case, and added:
"While the courts in other jurisdictions have held that the
tQne of voice and attitude of counsel in making on proper
occasions proper statements to the court may constitute con·
tempt, yet we are reluctant to extend the rule farther than
was done in the Platnauer and Shortridge cases, supra, and
hold that the occasion and the language being proper the intonations of the voice, the vehemence of the objections or the
physical attitude of counsel in making them, would alone
support the conclusion of the judge that such behavior was
disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent toward the court and
tended to interrupt the due course of the trial, and thus subject the offender to a judgment of fine and imprisonment.
The relations between court and counsel may and often do
during the course of a trial become strained; mutual conditions of irritation may be created in the heat of debate,
leading to tones and demeanor which in other situations
would clearly manifest contempt but which, under the conditions often existing in a hotly contested criminal case, such
as is indicated hy the record here, should lead to no such conclusion. Much must be pardoned under the circuIDStances
to the infirmities of human nature, and as much excused by
the liberty of speech if in the heat of a trial the expressions
of counsel are not always coldly precise, or his tones unmarked by excitement or even anger." (Curran v. Superior
Court, ,upra, at 267-268. See also, Bennett v. Superior Court,
73 Cal.App.2d 203, 225 [166 P.2d 318] ; Ex parte Crenshaw,
96 Tex. Crim. 654 [259 S.W. 587, 31 A.L.R. 1181).)
It is contended that the foregoing cases are opposed in the
District Courts of Appeal by another line of authority, whioo
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holds that the manner and tone used by an attorney may
alone constitute contempt regardless of the propriety of his
remarks. Although such statements can be found in the
cases of In re Hallinan, 126 Cal.App. 121 [14 P.2d 797], and
Rose v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605], an
examination of the facts contained in those cases shows that
they rest upon a different basis.
In the Hallinan case, the contempt order was occasioned
by the attorney's persistent interruption of the district attorney during the latter's closing argument. Petitioner and
the district attorney had stipulated that petitioner's objections would be saved for him in order to expedite the remainder of the trial. The trial judge ordered petitioner
several times to refrain from interrupting the district attorney, reminding him of his stipulation. Petitioner nevertheless repeatedly disobeyed the court and was finally found
in contempt. The trial judge's order recited the facts and
added that petitioner's conduct, "in manner, tone and method,
was disorderly, contemptuous, and that his attitude and behavior toward this Court, while the Court was holding said
session, was insolent. . . . " (In re Hallinan, supra, at p.
125.) The District Court of Appeal stated in its opinion
that petitioner's persistent interruptions contrary to the
stipulation and to the orders of the trial judge constituted
contempt. The court went on to state, however, that" .••
whether or not petitioner had the right to interrupt said proceedings for the purpose mentioned, it is apparent that the
manner in which he conducted himself in seeking to exercise
such right brought him clearly within the operation of the
provisions of said section 1209 [Code Civ. Proc.], and subjected him to punishment for contempt. . . . Under all the
authorities it is held that a contempt may be shown either by
language or behavior, and that although the language itself
may not be contemptuous, it may become so if uttered in an
insolent or defiant manner; and in determining whether the
language used was a contempt, regard must be had not only
to the very words used but to the surrounding circumstances,
the connections in which they were used, the tone, the look,
the manner and the emphasis." (In re Hallinan, supra, at
p. 128.)
In Rose v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605],
petitioner asked questions during the empanelling of the
jury that had been asked and answered many times. The
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trial judge directed petitioner to refrain frol1l repeating such
questions and finally, immediately after an admonition, petitioner proceeded to repeat the same question; he did this in
a sneering and loud manner, according to the order of contempt. The court again cautioned petitioner but he persisted in his manner of questioning and directed sarcastic
remarks to the trial judge. When the trial judge ordered
the jury to disregard certain of petitioner's remarks, the
latter stated, •• I demand an apology for that." One of the
jurors asked the trial judge to be excused siJ;lce petitioner was
so rude that she did not feel that she could treat his client
fairly. Petitioner continued in his behavior, however, and
threatened and shouted at witnesses after still other admonitions by the trial judge. The District Court of Appeal of
course refused to annul the order of contempt; but in affirming the order, the court quoted at length from In re Hallinan
to show that petitioner's manner alone constituted contempt.
(Rose v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 425-427. See also,
Gillen v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [99 P.2d
555], where the court held that petitioner's words were contemptuous in themselves but added that the trial judge
~orrectly noted in his order the tone and manner in which
the words were spoken.)
The results reached in both the Hallinan and Rose cases
were undoubtedly correct. We cannot agree with the dictum
contained in those cases, however, that if the words spoken
were proper the order of contempt must be affirmed on the
basis of a mere recital in the order that the •• tone, the look,
the manner and the emphasis" were contemptuous. We find
greater wisdom in the reasoning of the Platnauer and Curran
cases, which squarely considered the question of tone and
manner and decided that if the record fails to reveal improper conduct on the part of the attorney and does reveal
arbitrary or incorrect rulings by the trial judge, the order
of contempt must be annulled despite the recitals in the
judge's order th:1t the attorney was boisterous or insolent.
In the present case, the purported contempt is alleged to have
extended over many pages of court record, yet no mention is
made of it in the record. The record therefore fails to disclose a contemptuous interference by counsel with the progress
of the trial.
Broadly speaking, judges are empowered to punish summarily for contempt of court in order to facilitate the orderly
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administr3tion of justice. Disobedience of court orders tends
to lessen the effect of those orders; intemperate behavior in
the course of a trial, as illustrated by In re Hallinan and
Rose v. Superior Court, supra, lessens the mastery of the
trial judge over the progress of the proceedings and thus
tends to obstruct the course of the trial. Considerable summary power, not usually available to the officers of any other
branch of the government, is therefore vested in judges. If
that power is not wisely exercised it can readily become an
instrument of oppression. In a summary contempt proceeding the judge who metes out the punishment is usually the
injured party and the prosecutor as well. Since such a situation invites caprice, appellate courts almost without exception
require that the order adjudging a person in direct contempt
of court recite in detail the facts constituting the alleged
transgression rather than the bare conclusions of the trial
judge. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211; see anno., 154 A.L.R. 1227.)
This rule in itself demonstrates, if only by implication, that
some objective support must be present to support the order
of contempt. If a trial judge had only to state that the
contemnor raised his voice and twisted his features, no contempt order could be attacked. The well-recognized principle
that in a criminal contempt proceeding the accused is afforded
many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases
would be rendered meaningless. (Wilde v. Superior Court,
53 Cal.App.2d 168, 177 [127 P.2d 560] ; see, Dangel on Contempt, §§ 162 et seq.); and the burden of proof would be
sustained by the SUbjective reactions of the offended judicial
officer. The vagaries of human temperament alone cast doubt
upon the wisdom of applying the dictum of In re Hallinan to
a case where the facts do not show the aggravated misconduct
present in that case.
Another consideration is the fundamental interest of the
public in maintaining an independent bar. Attorneys must
be given a substantial freedom of expression in representing
their clients. "An advocate is at liberty, when addressing
the Court in regular course, to combat and contest strongly
any adverse views of the Judge or Judges expressed on the
case during its argument, to object to and protest against
any course which the Judge may take and which the advocate
thinks irregular or detrimental to the interests of his client,
and to caution juries against any interference by the Judge
with their functions, or with the advocate when addressing

..

)

796

GALLAGIIER

v.

MUNICIPAL COURT

[31 C.2d

them, or against any strong view adverse to his client expressed by the presiding Judge upon the facts of a case before
the verdict of the jury thereon. An advocate ought to be
allowed freedom and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his client's case." (Oswald, Contempt of Court (3d
ed.), pp. 56-57. See, People v. Rongetti, 344 Ill. 107, 122
(176 N.E. 292].) The public interest in an independent bar
would be subverted if judges were allowed to punish attorneys summarily for contempt on purely subjective reactions to their conduct or statements.
[3] An attorney has the duty to protect the interests of
his client. He has a right to press legitimate argument and
to protest an erroneous ruling. It is reported in Oswald on
Contempt of Court that the following interchange occurred
between Erskine and Buller, J.: "At length Erskine said,
'I stand here as an advocate for a brother citizen, and
I desire that the word "only" be recorded;' whereupon Buller,
J., said, 'Sit down, sir I remember your duty or I shall be
obliged to proceed in another manner,'-to which Erskine retorted, 'Your Lordship may proceed in whatever manner you
think fit. I know my duty as well as your Lordship knows
yours. I shall not alter my conduct.' The Judge took no
notice of this reply. Lord Campbell speaks of the conduct of
Erskine as 'a noble stand for the independence of the Bar.' "
(Oswald, (3d ed.), pp. 51-52.) The foregoing quotation is
illustrative of the rule in the Platnauer and Curran eases,
that an attorney may assert that which he believes to be correct in a forthright manner, if he is acting in the due course
of a judicial proceeding. (Matter of Botwein, 291 N.Y. 116,
122-123 [51 N.E.2d 669].)
[Zb] We do not mean to suggest, by anything said herein,
that it is impossible for an attorney to subject a judge to
ridienle and insult by intonations and gestures accompanying
words wholly innocuous, or that, in such event, the judge
is powerless to protect the dignity of the court. We merely·
recognize, as anyone must, that such a thing would be most
unusual, and that an attorney so skilled in the art of speech
and at the same time so lacking in an understanding of his !
obligations, could be curbed by first warning him of his mis- .
conduct, and, if he persisted, by disciplinary action. In the
preEellt case, however, petitioner was never warned that his
tone of voice was "loud, insolent, aggressive, belligerent,
boisterous, barsh, offensive and contemptuous" or that there
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was a "sneering and contemptuous expression" on his face.
The record does not show that the trial judge rebuked him
for his alleged "threatening demeanor" or his "disorderly
and insolent manner." The only ~arning to petitioner was
to refrain from participation in the investigation; it was
when petitioner endeavored to discover whether his client
was under arrest that he was declared to be in contempt.
Nor does the record reveal that petitioner disobeyed the lawful orders of the court. After he was told to "stay out of
these proceedings" he asked no questions of the witness. He
thereafter requested the court to be heard. The trial judge
did not censure him for these requests, but promptly denied
them. His final request for information regarding the arrest
of his client, which resulted in the order of contempt, was not
in disobedience of any lawful order of the court.
The record shows, therefore, only that an attorney was
persistent in his efforts to determine what was to be done
with his client., who was being escorted to the district attorney, presumably under arrest. The heat of courtroom
debate, particularly where liberty is concerned, often gives
rise to persistence on the part of counsel. If the words used
by counsel are respectful and pertinent to the matter before
the court, it is not unnecessarily burdensome to require the
judge first to warn the attorney that his tone and facial expressions are offensive and tend to interrupt the due course
of the proceeding. Otherwise, attorneys could be subjected
to fines and jail sentences because of personal annoyance and
pique on the part of trial judges; and these penalties could
be rendered unassailable, as is contended here, by lengthy
recitals in the orders of contempt respecting the demeanor of
the conteJnner. There is nothing in the reported decisions or
in the experience of our courts that makes necessary such an
extraordinary authority on the part of the trial judge. Indeed, the recognition of such an authority would involve the
surrender of a substantial amount of the independence of the
bar, and in many instances would deprive litigants of a fair
hearing.
The order adjudging petitioner in contempt is annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
SHENK, J.-I dissent.
This case comcs directly within the rulc of the eases {In re
Rollinan, 126 Cal.App. 121 [14 P.2d 797] ; Rose v. Superior
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Court, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605]) which the majority
opinion refuses to follow but seeks to distinguish for insufficient
reasons. By disapproving the general doctrine followed in
those cases the majority opinion has upset the settled rule concerning the scope of inquiry in a certiorari proceeding to rewew an order of contempt.
For the purpose of determining the lawful exercise of jurisdiction in a summary contempt proceeding the recitals of the
facts in the order of commitment must be deemed to be true.
There is no procedure for the taking of evidence to contradict
the facts so recited. This the majority 'opinion implicitly
concedes; and it is not questioned that the recitals of the attorney's tone, manner and attitude, being matters within the
observation of the court, are findings of fact. (Bose v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App. at 426; Gt1len v. Municipal
Court, 37 Cal.App.2d 428,431 [99 P.2d 555], with citation of
In re Hallinan, supra.)
A court is the judge of its own con tempts, its judgment is
subject to review only on the question of jurisdiction, and
the judgment of contempt is valid if the recital of facts therein
shows acts which come within the legal definition of a direct
contempt. (Otis v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 129 [82 P. 853] ;
In re Hallinan, supra.) As said in Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289 [9 8.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405], whether the attorney's conduct
justified the punishment, was for the court to determine under
its responsibility to do justice and to maintain its own authority, and its findings upon the facts are conclusive.
The foregoing rules are of long standing and are sound
guiding principles for both trial and appellate courts in order
to maintain the balance between the required respect for judicial authority and the asserted necessity for an independent
bar. Abrogation thereof would destroy the functional power
of the court.
It is now held by the majority that the requirement for
the jurisdictional recital of facts in the contempt order is not
complied with merely by stating in the order that the words
uttered· by the attorney were •• in a loud, insolent, aggressive,
belligerent, boisterous, harsh, offensive and contemptuous tone
of voice and with a sneering and contemptuous expression on
his face and a threatening demeanor toward" the court and
the judge, and "in a disorderly and insolent manner," followed by the conclusion that such manner and conduct tended
to and did interrupt the due course of the trial and interfered
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with the orderly proceedings of the court. It should not be
required, as it would now seem to be, that the court have a
sound-recording device and a motion picture camera in effectual operation at all times in the courtroom in order to make
a record· in the trial or proceeding of the insolent tone of
voice and the offensive nature of the conduct of the attorney,
including his facial expressions, before its recital of the facts
may be taken as true and be sufficient to show that its order
was not arbitrary or in excess of jurisdiction. The majority
opinion does not question that the constant interruptions
and disobedience of the court's rulings, in respectful words
but in the manner and with the intemperate tones and attitudes which tend to interfere with the due course of ths
proceeding would constitute contempt. However, before the
court may commit the contemner it is required that the facts
so found must also be shown by the record of the proceedings,
that is, by appropriate admonitions and warnings regarding
the attorney's tone and manner. In other words, a record of
repetition of rulings and admonitions to obey, the continued
disobedience on the part of the attorney, together with the
findings of other matters of tone, expression, and conduct
within the court's observation, no longer support the exercise
of jurisdiction to declare a direct contempt.
Section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The
following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice,
or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the
court: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court, tending to interrupt the
due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 2. ..•
boisterous conduct • • . tending to interrupt the due course
of a trial or other judicial proceeding; . . ." The law thus
imposes upon the judicial officer the duty to see that court
proceedings are conducted in an orderly manner. Confidence
must be reposed somewhere in the matter of upholding the
authority and integrity of the courts as a forum for the orderly
settlement of disputes. And indeed it will come as a surprise to those charged with the orderly conduct of judicial
proceedings that credence will not be accorded the recital of
matters within their observation and which cannot always
conveniently be reflected by the record of the trial or proceeding. In my opinion the line bas correctly been drawn by the
prior decisions of our appellate courts. The additional element now required before jurisdiction attaches to declare
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contemptuous an attorney's persistent offensive or intemperate tone or manner is a burden for which there is no
authority beyond the majority's ipsi dixit.
Furthermore, the proceeding in progress in the respondent
court was unquestionably a proper inquiry for the purpose
of determining whether the minds of the particular jurors
approached by Mrs. Hill had become prejudiced so that the
trial should not proceed. The court correctly announced that
Mrs. Hill was not on trial. In that proceeding the court had I
no power to mete out punishment to Mrs. Hill, nor was it
sitting as a committing magistrate. Her attorney had no
proper place in the proceeding unless Mrs. Hill was called to
the witness stand, which she was not, in which event he might i
then counsel her concerning her rights and make appropriate
objections. In fnet, the majority opinion concedes that the
trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Hill and lwr attorney
had no rig"ht to participate in the proceeding. There was no
ruling or order of thc court which might be said to have
changed the natllre of the investigation. The cases followed
in the majority opinion (Ourran v. Superinr Court, 72 Cal.
.A.pp. 258 [236 P. 975) ; Platnaucr Y. Superior 001trt, 32 Cnl.
App.463 [163 P. 237) ; and In re Shortridge, G Cnl.App. 371
[90 P. 478]) from nil that appeared in the order or the
record, involved the persistence of an attorney in adYocating
a point which he had a right to make in a trial where he had
the rig"ht and the duty to be. The present C.'lse involves the
officious and persistent disobedience of an order excluding the
attorn~y from participation in a proceeding where he had no
right and where interference would bccloud the issue and
unnecessarily prolong the investigation.
It is but to cavil with the facts to state that the only
foundation for the contempt order was the incident which
occurred after the judge ordered Mrs. Hill to be taken to the
district attorney. The petitioner's remarks at that time were
but the culmination of his persistent and officious conduct
from which he had been properly advised by the court to
refrain. On this view of the record it is unnecessary to conf;ider whether the words uttered by the petitioner were in
themselves disn'spcctful or wbether, as a separate question,
the findinb'S that they were loud, boisterous, contemptuous,
~mcering, etc., Vlere alone sufficient to constitute a ('.Ontcmpt.
Where the basie conduct of tbe attorney is impropc:>r, and is
persisted in against the repeated admonitions and orders of
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t11(' court, we have a situation which is ruled by the Hallinan,
Hose and other cases attempted to be distinv,uishl'd, :lUd the
Ollelll:;iveness of manner thereupon becomes merely cumulative,
In my opinion the order should be nftlrmcd.
Edmonds, J" and Spence, J" concurred.
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